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Security Information

WORKING DRAFT  
MGN  
21 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: SPP  
  
FROM: SR/CPP  
  
SUBJECT: Comments on PSB D-24, "Program of Psychological Preparation for Stalin's Passing from Power."

1. SR Division concurs in principle with the comments expressed in the subject paper. We feel, however, the following additional factors should be included for consideration by the PSB:

a. Effect of the latest developments of the 19th Party Congress on the course of action outlined in the subject paper. Specifically, the following points should be considered:

(1) Elimination of the Politburo and its replacement by the Presidium.

(2) Stalin's role in the new party and state structures.

(3) Any indication that the changes brought about by the 19th Party Congress have created machinery necessary for the gradual and orderly transition of power from Stalin to the new group or individual..

(4) Malenkov's role in the new power complex.

b. Examination of the other conflicts within the Soviet structure:

(1) The Military versus the political apparatus.

(2) Security apparatus versus the Military and the Political.

c. Although Stalin's eventual death can be regarded as a certainty, strains between the individuals and groups connected with the problem of succession should not be placed in the same category. We have no evidence that the existing "strains" between the individuals and groups are of such magnitude that they will culminate automatically in the internal conflict or lead to the inter-party struggle. Moreover, we

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should not assume that despite the existing rivalries, jealousies, etc., there may not be an orderly transition of power which would assure at least a short period of order and tranquillity until the existing or created frictions would have sufficient time to fertilize. We must certainly assume that Stalin is fully aware of this instability and probably has devoted considerable time to making sure that his accomplishment will not be undermined by internal dissension. In such a case, it would be more profitable for us to advance our attack on two separate but related fronts. One attack directed to develop new and intensify old personal frictions among the top leadership; and another coordinated attack directed to place the military in opposition to the political apparatus.

2. SR/CPD assumes that the detailed paper which is now being prepared on "knowledge" will serve as a basis for a coordinated reply to the subject document.

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